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Article 5

Dewsnup v. Timm 1 : Judicial Sleight of
Hand in Statutory Construction of the
Bankruptcy Code
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States Law Week hailed Dewsnup v. Timm 2 as
"the most complicated issue of statutory construction in this
term's bankruptcy crop."3 The Court used this case to settle
a debate over contradictory attempts among the circuits to
interpret sections 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 4 The interpretive attempts applied to a Chapter 7
debtor's ability to "strip down" a creditor's lien on real property to the current value of the property. This casenote first
outlines the background leading to different statutory interpretations among the circuits and the facts of Dewsnup
chosen by the Court to settle the debate. This note then
outlines the proceedings of Dewsnup from the bankruptcy
court to the Supreme Court. This note then proceeds to
examine the reasoning of the Court's three-part test used in
arriving at the Dewsnup decision and explains how the
Court's reasoning departs from previous practice. Finally,
this note suggests a more specific application of the above
three-part test to Dewsnup using the reasoning of a previous bankruptcy case.

II.

BACKGROUND

There has been a considerable difference in opmwn
dividing the circuits regarding the relationship between sections 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 The dis-

1.

112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).

2.
3.
4.
5.

ld.
61 U.S.L.W. 3067, 3072 (U.S. Aug. 11, 1992).
11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988), reads in full:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section
553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the
amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
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pute revolved around the rights of the debtor and creditor
when a lien is undersecured. The Court granted certiorari in
Dewsnup to settle that dispute. In doing so, the Court recognized that the submissions of the parties and amici were
model representatives of the issues involved in the interpretation of the relationship between sections 506(a) and
506(d). 6 Because these issues go to ownership and credit,
the basis of the secured transaction, they are very im portant to a society that operates on credit and values ownership rights in property. The issues involve the balance of
competing interests. The first is the supposed "fresh start"
offered a debtor in bankruptcy. The other is the interest of
a creditor seeking her contractual due when a debtor defaults. How society balances these interests affects the availability of consumer and commercial loans as well as the
interest rates paid for these loans.
These issues are especially acute when, in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the amount of a creditor's lien is above the
current value of the property securing the lien. Sometimes,
and for several possible reasons, a loan becomes
undersecured; thus the collateral is worth less than the
amount owed. Technically, this bifurcates the loan into secured and unsecured portions. Before Dewsnup, courts treated the undersecured lien differently, using either a "strip

Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation
and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting
such creditor's interest.
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,
is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such
claim arose.
(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured
claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such
claim.
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that
is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless(!) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of
this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure
of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
6.

Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776-77.
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down" action or a Dewsnup approach. A "strip down" voids
the unsecured portion of the lien, giving no relief to the
creditor for that portion of the lien. A Dewsnup approach
just affects the priority of distribution from the debtor's
estate, maintaining both parts of the creditor's loan. The
part equal to the value of the collateral is secured. The
other portion is considered an unsecured claim, treated with
all other general claims on the bankruptcy estate.
The circuit disagreement revolved around the issue of
this "strip down." Stripping the portion of the creditor's lien
above the current value of the property leaves no recourse
available to the creditor, but does provide the debtor with
incentive to redeem the property. Gaglia v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Association7 illustrates this rule. This was
considered the majority position. 8 The fresh start doctrine
in bankruptcy justified this rule.
Other courts formed a "strong minority'>!! agreeing with
the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re Dewsnup. 10 These
courts reasoned that the lien overage should not be stripped
away. The creditor's lien is bifurcated into secured and
unsecured portions. This allows the secured lienholder some
solace as well as the benefit of pre-foreclosure sale increases
in real property value. Both views came from interpretations
of sections 506(a) and 506(d).

III. THE PROCEEDINGS
A.

Case Facts

Petitioner Althea Dewsnup and her husband borrowed
$119,000 from the respondents. A Deed of Trust on two parcels of Utah farmland owned by the Dewsnups secured the
loan. One year later, petitioner defaulted on the loan. Respondents issued a notice of default and began a foreclosure
of the collateral property. Petitioner filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition seeking liquidation, staying the foreclosure.
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, petitioner represented that the then owing debt (about
$120,000) exceeded the court-found fair market value of the

7.
8.
9.

10.

889 F .2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 589 (lOth Cir. 1990).
!d.
!d.
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land ($39,000). The petitioner asked the court to apply the
"strip down" approach and thus reduce the lien to $39,000.
The immediate benefits to the petitioner would be the removal of a sizeable claim against the estate and a greater
motivation to redeem the property.

B.

Procedural History

The Bankruptcy Court denied petitioner relief. 11 The
United States District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court
without an opinion. 12 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit also affirmed. 13 The United States Supreme Court
later granted certiorari. 14

C.

Supreme Court Holding

The Supreme Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor may
not "strip down" a creditor's lien on real property to the
judicially determined value of the collateral when that value
is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien.
IV.

REASONING

A. Lower Courts' Reasoning
The Supreme Court touched only lightly on the rationales of the lower courts. The lower courts denied relief to
the petitioner because the trustee abandoned the property.
Abandonment means the property returns to the debtor and
is no longer part nor concern of the estate. Therefore, section 506(a), and section 506(d) by implication, no longer applied because the property was no longer "property in which
the estate has an interest." 15 There is no specific indication
why Justice Blackmun's majority opinion did not use this
reasoning. Apparently this rationale would not allow the
Supreme Court to get at the issue of statutory construction.
Therefore, the Court undoubtedly embarked on an analysis
allowing it to reach the statutory construction issue brewing
just beyond the scope of the lower courts' holdings.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988).
Dewsnup v. Thrun, 112 S. Ct. at 776 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a).
Dewsnup v. Tirrun, 908 F.2d 588 (lOth Cir. 1990).
In re Dewsnup, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
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B. Positions of the Parties and Amici
Petitioner argued that sections 506(a) and 506(d) are
complementary and should be read together. 16 Petiti9ner
reasoned that the plain language of the statute indicates a
relationship between the security reducing provision of section 506(a) 17 and the lien avoiding provision of section
506(d). 18 If the two sections are complementary and related, it is easier to accept the idea that "allowed secured
claim" means the same thing in both sections.
Petitioner's amicus argued the lien voiding language of
section 506(d) is plain. When faced with a claim other than
an allowed secured claim, the bankruptcy court must void
it. Amicus further reasoned that the effect of the Tenth
Circuit's decision would lead to evisceration of a debtor's
right of redemption and that undersecured creditors would
be unable to participate in the distribution of the assets of
the estate. 19
Respondents answered that sections 506(a) and 506(d)
are not "rigidly tied" to each other. 20 They argued that
506(a) deals with classifying claims at the time of distribution. This interpretation relies on the closing language of
506(a). "Such value shall be determined in light of the ...
proposed disposition or use of such property
. ."21 But
the lien voiding power of 506(d) is directed at the time

16.

Petitioner explains:
Because, under section 506(a), a claim is secured only to the extent of the
judicially determined value of the real property on which the lien is fixed,
a debtor can void a lien on the property pursuant to section 506(d) to the
extent the claim is no longer secured and thus is not 'an allowed secured
claim.' In other words, section 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims allowed
under section 502 into secured claims and unsecured claims; any portion
of an allowed claim deemed to be unsecured under section 506(a) is not
an 'allowed secured claim' within the lien-voiding scope of section 506(d).
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776-77.
Supra note 4. Since an "allowed claim" is divided into allowed secured and
17.
allowed unsecured portions when the claim is undersecured, petitioner urged that
respondents would have an "allowed secured claim" only to the extent of the judicially determined value of the collateral.
18.
Supra note 4. Petitioner argued the Court must void the unsecured portion
of respondents' claim because it was not an "allowed secured claim" within the
meaning of § 506(a).
19.
!d. at 777.
!d. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7).
20.
21.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
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when foreclosure takes place, referring to the exceptions to
the voiding power, which in turn refer to occurrences at the
start of bankruptcy.
Respondents and the United States as amicus curiae
argued in the alternative that the words "allowed secured
claim" in section 506(d) do not have to be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to section 506(a).
Instead, respondents and amicus reasoned that each claim
must be examined first as an allowed claim, and then as a
secured claim. Respondents then concluded that since the
claim in question is allowed under section 502 and is secured by a lien on underlying property, it does not fall
within the lien voiding power of section 506( d). Section
506(d) voids only claims that are not allowed and not secured.
Lastly, respondents made two additional arguments. The
first related to pre-Code bankruptcy law. Historically, liens
like the one in question passed through bankruptcy preserved. Respondents argued that nothing in the Code's legislative history reflects an intent to alter the law. Therefore,
the pre-Code standard controls. The second argument related
to the policy that bankruptcy provides a fresh start to the
debtor. One purpose served by the bankruptcy process is to
relieve an insolvent party of excessive indebtedness. This is
accomplished either by liquidation or by a reorganization
allowing the party to make reasonable payments on his
indebtedness. Respondents claimed such a policy cannot
justify an impairment of respondents' property rights. This
is because the fresh start policy does not extend to an in
rem claim against property, only to a discharge of personal
liability.

C. Reasoning of the High Court
The Court recited the various positions of the parties
and amici in its opinion to prove "that section 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other provisions of
that Code do embrace some ambiguities."22 This is the only
proof the Court used to determine the facial ambiguity of
sections 506(a) and 506(d).

22.

Id.
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In spite of the scarce position, it is this finding of ambiguity by the Court that decided the outcome by triggering a
three-part test involving (1) ambiguity, (2) legislative history
analysis and (3) pre-Code law analysis. Although the Court
said it was inclined to agree with petitioner's argument that
the words "allowed secured claim" should take on the same
meaning in both subsections, 23 pre-Code law and the practical effect of petitioner's argument persuaded the Court to
find for respondents, upon finding that sections 506(a) and
506(d) were ambiguous. 24 Thus, respondents won by default.
Mter deciding that the number of different arguments
espoused in Dewsnup was the equivalent of a finding of
ambiguity, the Court turned to the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Court found no significant language
in the legislative history to warrant a change from the preCode law. 25 Thus, an examination of pre-Code law was in
order. The Court determined that under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bankruptcy
unaffected. The Court cited several cases to support this
proposition. 26 The Court put its findings together to deny
petitioner's requested relief. 27 On this basis, the United

2:1.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
In interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Court does not do so with blind24.
ers on. This means previous related judicial and legislative action must be considered. In the absence of clear statutory text and in light of long-standing pre-Code
practice, the Court will not presume to do the job of the legislature. The pre-Code
law must be examined as well as the legislative history surrounding the drafting
of the Code. If a particular interpretation contradicts pre-Code law, something in
the legislative history must justify such an interpretation.
25.
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991) ("Ordinarily, liens
26.
and other secured interests survive bankruptcy."); Johnson v. Home State Bank,
111 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991) ("Rather, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only
one mode of enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in personam-while leaving intact another-namely, an action against the debtor in rem.");
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 579 (1935) ("No instance has been found, except under the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or
decision compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the mortgagor free
of the lien unless the debt was paid in full."); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886)
(holding that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real estate of the debtor
from the lien of a mortgage created by him before the bankruptcy).
27.
The Court stated:
[G liven the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to
grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become 'unsecured' for the purposes of section 506(a) with-
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States Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Tenth
Circuit.

V.

ANALYSIS

The Dewsnup Court used the historic form of looking at
a statute using three steps. First, the Court asked whether
the challenged words were plain or ambiguous. Second, the
Court looked at these words in light of the legislative history of the Code. Third, the Court looked to the pre-Code law.
This analysis will show that the Court used the correct
form for general examination, but the examination lacked
specific detail and substance.
A.

First Step: A Finding of Ambiguity

As Justice Scalia28 correctly observed in his dissent,
the Court avoided a thorough use of the available analysis
techniques. The Dewsnup Court disregarded an existing test
used in the first step of statutory inquiry. Another Bankruptcy Code case decided recently involving section 506(b)
outlined this test. 29 Sweeping aside contentions by the parties, the opinion in Ron Pair started "where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself."30
This is the best place to start with any legislative inquiry.
The Court in Ron Pair unfolded a three-part method of
inquiry. First, a "natural reading of the [relevant] phrase."
Second, an examination of the "grammatical structure of the

out the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in
the annals of Congress is not plausible . . . and is contrary to basic
bankruptcy principles.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
28.
Two schools of thought dominate judicial interpretation of the law. One
favors the establishment of clear roles, providing bright lines applicable to all cases
in the field. One attribute of this is dependability. The other approach favors the
balancing of interests. An attribute of this is fairness. Students of Constitutional
law will note that Justice Scalia is well known for his advocacy of rule-based
decisionmaking. It seems only fitting that Justice Scalia should be the one to dissent here. In Dewsnup, the Court appears to depart from a previous method of
determination (rule basis) in a case standing as precedent in order to reach a
conclusion it feels is correct. Justice Scalia points this out.
United StateH v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (addressing the
29.
issue of whether non-consensual, over-secured creditors were entitled to post-petition interest).
30.
!d. at 241.
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statute." Third, a comparison with similar terms used
throughout the Code."31
A bankruptcy litigator, not to mention the Courts of
Appeal, will be confused by the method used in Dewsnup.
In Ron Pair the Court clearly laid out the test for a finding
of statutory ambiguity. The Court gave detail to its method.
In Dewsnup, the Court, in substance, cast all that aside and
made no inquiry on its own as to the ambiguity of sections
506(a) and 506(d). As pointed out previously in part IV.C.,
there is no evidence of an independent analysis. The Court
was quick to find ambiguity. This is important to understand since the Court can generally only get at statutory
interpretation if the language is ambiguous. If a statute's
language is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."32 It leaves the litigator and
circuit court justice wondering what method will be used by
the Court when next called on to interpret a statute. It is
unclear whether plainness or ambiguity is decided by an
independent test or by the mood and structure of the Court
on appeal. This makes adequate representation, preparation
and judicial finding most difficult.
Instead of listing the various positions of the parties
and amici as evidence of statutory ambiguity, the Court
should have made its own inquiry. Just because parties disagree as to the meaning of a statute does not mean the
statute is ambiguous. A party's personal agenda, either
consciously or subconsciously, affects statutory reading. A
neutral party may find it plain and clear through independent analysis after a presentation by advocates in our adversarial system. The Court should have embarked on a
reading of both subsections, studied their grammatical structure and examined use of similar terminology throughout
the Code.

31.
32.

Id. at 241, 242 n.5.
Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
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1. Applying the three-part Ron Pair Standard
a. A "natural reading" of the statute. Section 506(a) has
several pertinent terms. They include "allowed claim," "secured claim" and "unsecured claim." The section clearly differentiates between an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim. The former exists "to the extent of
the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in such property . . . . "33 In other words, an allowed secured claim exists when the creditor's interest is less than
or equal to the value the property has to the estate. The
latter exists "to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed
claim."34 "Such creditor's interest" refers to the "secured
claim" which is defined in section 506(a). Therefore, that
portion of the creditor's allowed claim that is greater than
the secured claim is an "allowed unsecured claim."
Using the facts of Dewsnup, this means that the lien
was an allowed claim. The judicially determined value of
the property was $39,000. 35 This is the value the property
had to the estate. Thus, $39,000 of respondents' lien represented an allowed secured claim and $81,00036 represented
an allowed unsecured claim, both defined by section 506(a).
While subsection (a) of section 506 carefully defines
"allowed secured claim" and "allowed unsecured claim," subsection (d) confuses the statute's meaning by using the term
"allowed secured claim" negatively: "a claim . . . that is not
an allowed secured claim . . .."37 A claim "that is not an
allowed secured claim" could be either a disallowed claim or
an allowed unsecured claim. Two things lead the reader to
choose allowed unsecured claim as the better choice. First,
section 506(a) makes reference to allowed unsecured claims
but not to disallowed claims. Second, since section 506(d)
uses the specific terni "disallowed claim" elsewhere, it leads
the reader to think the two are separate terms. Therefore, a

33.
34.
35.
36.
lowed
:~7.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988), supra note 4.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988), supra note 4.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
!d. The amount owing on the lien was $120,000. Subtract the $39,000 alsecured claim and that leaves $81,000 as the allowed unsecured claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) (emphasis added), supra note 4.
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natural reading of section 506(d) leads the reader to infer "a
claim . . . that is not an allowed secured claim . . . ," refers to an allowed unsecured claim. This suggests that a
lien securing an allowed unsecured claim is void. In
Dewsnup, this means the $81,000 portion of the lien is void.

b. The grammatical structure. A study of the
grammatical structure is a look at the use of punctuation,
conjunctive words and modifiers within the statute. 38 Writings (like statutes) that attempt to cover many possibilities
are often fraught with veritable mazes of phrases set aside
by commas. Many times terms and modifiers are hopelessly
set apart this way. By a careful mapping of the phrases the
reader can clear away potential ambiguities. Fortunately,
the sections pertinent to this analysis are clear.
The focus here is on the term "allowed secured claim"
as used in section 506(d). The emphasis is here because the
Court adopted respondents' position that the words are not
an indivisible term of art. 39 The pertinent part of section
506(d) reads: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim,
such lien is void, . . . ."40 There is no comma between "allowed" and "secured," nor is there any word between the
two indicating a break in the term (i.e., "allowed or secured
claim"). Grammatically, the words "allowed secured claim"
are an indivisible term. Therefore, a lien securing a claim
that is not both an allowed and a secured claim is void
under section 506( d).
c. Use of the terminology throughout the Code. Under
this prong, consistent term usage throughout the Code is
sought. 41 Since Congress chose the vague language of a
"claim ... that is not an allowed secured claim ..." rather

38.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989).
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
39.
40.
11 u.s.c. § 506(d) (1988).
41.
The Court has often invoked the "'normal rule of statutory construction that
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning.'" Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (1990) (quoting Sorenson
v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)))).
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than one of the two specific possibilities, it is a natural
assumption that Congress intended both terms to be usable
in the context of the section 506(d) voiding power. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Bankruptcy Code
is consistent in its use of the phrase "allowed unsecured
claim" to describe that portion of the claim treated as unsecured as under section 506(a). 42 Similarly, the Code is consistent in its use of the term "disallowed claim."43 Since
the Code consistently uses both "allowed unsecured claim"
and "disallowed claim" where applicable, the use of a more
encompassing term is not ambiguous. Either type of claim is
subject to the lien voiding power.
B.

The Second Step: Relevant Legislative History

"[W]here the language is unambiguous, silence in the
legislative history cannot be controlling."44 This quotation
plainly states that once the above analysis has reached the
conclusion that sections 506(a) and 506(d) are plain, the
analysis stops and the plain meaning controls. As stated
earlier, this is true usually, but a noticeable exception exists. "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters."'45
The most interesting part of the Court's legislative history analysis is not the history itself. Instead it is the
Court's radical change of attitude from 1989 to 1992, about
what the history means. The Court found no particular
language in the history to support or refute petitioner's
claims. The Court then detailed a historical line of cases

42.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) (fixing priority of "allowed unsecured
claims of governmental units"); § 726(a)(2) (providing for payment of "allowed unsecured claim!s]" in Chapter 7 liquidation); § 1225(a)(4) (setting standard for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 12 plan); § 1325(a)(4) (setting
standard for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 13 plan).
43.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988) (stating, if "claim . . . is disallowed" involuntary bankruptcy can continue); § 522 (bad faith adversarial proceeding by
creditor can result in "claim being disallowed"); § 723 (grounds for disallowing
claims of partnership creditors); § 1126 (creditor whose claim is disallowed is not
entitled to vote on Chapter 11 plan); § 1328 ("specifically discharges claims that
are not allowed").
44.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
45.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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holding that a lien survives bankruptcy intact. 46 The opinion then stated "Congress must have enacted the Code with
a full understanding of this practice."47 Furthermore, the
Court stated, "When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws,
it does not write 'on a clean slate."'48 Putting these factors
together, the Court put quite a bit of emphasis on pre-Code
law.
When faced with the same type of decision in the Ron
Pair case the Court had a completely different approach.
Initially, it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the
formulation of the Code for nearly a decade. It was intended to modernize the bankruptcy laws, and as a result
made significant changes in both the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy. In particular, Congress intended "significant changes from current law in . . . the treatment of secured creditors and secured claims." In such a
substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or
realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took. Rather, as long as the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no
need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of
the statute. 49

The finding by the Dewsnup Court that "Congress must
have enacted the Code with a full understanding of this
practice [of lien survivaly>5° does not equate with a finding
that the plain reading of sections 506(a) and 506(d) produces "a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters." 51 Therefore, by the Court's own admission in Ron
Pair, the plain reading controls.

C.

The Third Step: Pre-Code Law

Justice Blackmun's opinion does, as previously stated,
provide a fine showing of the state of the pre-Code law in

46.
Supra note 25 (referring to Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779).
47.
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
48.
ld. (quoting Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943)).
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (cita49.
tions omitted).
50.
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
51.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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the area of lien survival through bankruptcy. 52 However,
the pre-Code law is of little consequence in light of the
analysis in parts V.A.l.-V.B. concerning the natural reading
of sections 506(a) and 506(d) and the lack of finding that
the plain reading is at odds with the drafters intent.
D.

Policy Considerations

Policy-wise, the Court pointed out that the practical
effect of petitioner's argument would be to freeze the
creditor's secured interest at the value found in the court
proceeding. Time will pass between the date of such determination and the date of the sale and the property value
could increase in the interim. However, the creditor would
be unable to collect more than the judicially approved value.
The excess would go to the debtor as a "windfall." A perfected secured creditor then could not rely on the safety his
status purports to give. No loan could truly be considered
safe from a "strip down." Among other things, this increased
risk would lead to higher mortgage interest rates. This may
have weighted the Court's analysis. However, there is no
provision for these considerations in the three-part test set
out and used.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's application of the statutory construction of
sections 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is essentially form without substance. Statutory construction involves three steps. First, a court must find whether a statute is plain or ambiguous on its face. Second, a court looks
to legislative history to find the intent of the drafters.
Third, a court looks to the pre-Code law. Clearly the emphasis is on the first step. If the statute is plain on its
face, it is only construed otherwise if it produces "a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." 53
That is a high hurdle to get over. If the statute is facially
ambiguous, a court examines it in light of both legislative
intent and pre-Code law. Lacking clear legislative intent, the
pre-Code practice controls.

52.
53.

Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 77fl-79.
Supra note 44.
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The Dewsnup Court apparently started the process with
a policy oriented result in mind. The process was not objectively undertaken. The analysis lacked depth. The Court
glossed over the plain versus ambiguous analysis. The Court
also acted inconsistently with precedent in interpreting the
state of legislative history. This allowed the Court to give
unnecessary weight to the pre-Code law in order to invalidate the mortgage "strip down."
Had the Court undertaken a more thorough and neutral
analysis, the plainness of the statutory language would have
been clear. Use of the more thorough analysis opens the
door to a different result, one which eliminates the policy
consideration guesswork for practitioners and fact finders.
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